For Kr:rt Lewin (cf. Lewin, Dembo, Festilger, & Sears, Ig44), therewas never any doubtthat motivationalphenomena can onlybe properlyunderstood and analyzedftom an action peispective. Indeed, as he pointed out in support of this clairn, processes of goal setting and goal strivin g are governed by dis -. tinct psychoiogical principles. These insights went unheeded for several decades, however, probably for ttle simple rea--"-son that goal setting research based on the eq)ectancy-value paradigm proved so successfir.L (Festinger, 1942; Atkinson, 1957) and captured the firll attention of motivation psychologists. It was not until the emergence of the psychology ofgoals (starting with Klinger's cunent concerns, L977, and Wicklund's and Gollwitzer's self-definitional goa1s, 1982) and the psychology of action control (based on Kuilt analysis of state vs. action orientation,.1983; see Chapter 12) that rhe processes and potential strategies of goal striving began to receive the attention that Kurt Lewin had already felt they deserved back in the I 940s (Oettingen & Gollwitz er, .200 1) . in contrast to the behaviorist approach, an action perspectivg on human behavior meals ertending the scope of anaiysis beyond simpie stimulus-response bonds and the execution of leamed habits. The concept of action is seen in opposition to suchlearnedhabits andautomatic responses; itisrestricttidto those human behaviors that have what Max Weber Q92L) , termed "Sinn" ("mealing" or "sense"). InWeber's conceptu:-' alization, "action" is allhumanbehavior that the actor deems to have "meaning." Likewise, externa-l observers apply the criterion of "meaaing" to determine whether or not another person's behavior constitutes "action": are there discernibie' "reasons" for that behar,ior? DEFINITION From this perspective, actions can be defineci as all activities directed ioward an "intended Eoal."
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The motivation psychoiogy of action focuses on quesoithose goais (Lervin, I926b)and, atthe same time, to incordons of action control. These issues are imporrant becauseporatebothwithin asingle, unilvingftamework (Heckhausen, asactionpsychoiogyresearchhasshournrepeatedly-asirong 1987a (Heckhausen, asactionpsychoiogyresearchhasshournrepeatedly-asirong , 1989 Hecltrausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) . In a marrner motivation to achieve a certain outcome or engage in a of speaking, the model examines the transition from wishcprtajn behavior does not normally suffi.ce for that behavior ing to weighing in goal selection arrd from weighing to will-+^ lrc imnlemcnteri illd t}1s goal to be realized (Gollwitzer & ing in actual goal pursuit (Heckhausen, f987b). knportantl,v, ' Bargh, 1996; Heckhausen, 1989; Kuhl, 1.983 ). In fact, success-it highlights the disitnctions between goal setring and goal r various acdon control strategies (e.g., formulating "if-then" It was precisely thal kind of indiscriminate approach that pluns, resuntgggi_egypt:d actiols, slepppg up e ed confusion ür the history of motivation psychol-:..''tfrefaceofdif0culties;cf.GoIlwitzer&na1phenomenabeingnegiecteci ' tions 11.5-11.7).
tl.2 The Rubicon Model of Action Phases
tt--'= 'Th" fo"us of this section is on the course of action, which the .,r-tir---Rubicon model of action phases understands to be a tempo-,
.rat, horizontalpath startingwith aperson's desires andending .
with the evaluation of the action outcomes achieved (Gollwitzer,1990; Heckhausen, l987a; 1989; Heckhausen & Goll-., t, witzer, 1987) . The Rubicon model seeks to provide answers to the following questions: '::, s Howdbpeopleselecttheirgoals? i,, -:
s Howdotheyplantheexecutionofthosegoals? s How do they enact these plans?
i i ciflc goal?
,:'' -"" 0 The major innovation of the Rubicon model was to define clear 1 I boundaries between motivational and volitional action phases. ', i These boundaries mark functional shifts between mindsets conment. The three most important boundaries are atthe transition from , ' , ' the motivational phase before a decision is made to the subsequent . in itiation of action, and finally atthe üansition from the action phase :
back to the motivational (postactional) evaluation phase.
t!.2.7 Action Phases
Heckhausen's Rubicon modei of action phases was inspired bythe necessity to distinguish two major issues in motivation psychologythe selection ofa;tion goals and the realization Figure 11 .1 The Rubicon model of action phases. (Heckhausen & Gollwiuer, 1987) Nlotivation predecisional for decades Gleckhausen, 1987c Gleckhausen, , 1989 Kuhl, 1983 , Goliwitzer, f 990, 1991 . Given that the processes of goal setting and goal striving serve a common function, however, ii was impoitant that they should not be seen as isolated, independent phenomena either. The Rubicon model gets around this difficulty by tracking the ernergence of a motivational tendency over timeftom fhe awakening of wishes to goal selection and commitment, arrd finally goal deactivation. It seeks to describe the emergence, maturation, and fading of motivation, dividing a course of action into four natural, consecutive phases separated by ciear boundaries or transition points. These four action phases differ in terms of the tasks that have tobe addressedbefore the individual canmove onto thenext phase. The distinctions the model draws beilveen consecutive action phases are thus both structural and functional in nature.
According to the Rubicon model, a course of action involves a phase of deliberating the positive and negative potential consequences of various nonbinding wishes and action alternatives (predecisional phase), a phase of planning concrete strategies for achieving the goal selected at the end of the predecisional phase (preactional/postdecisional phase), a phase of enacting these strategies (actional phase), and finally a phase of evaluating the action outcome (postactional phase; Fig. 11 .1; see also Fig. 1.3 in Chapter 1).
(B IIe four phases of the Rubicon model differ in terms of the tasks that have to be addressed before the individual can move 0n t0 ' the next phase. Motivational episodes are thus broken down into "natural" and seemingly independent phases. Cntically, the Rubic0n model seeks to explain both goal setting and goal striving. The first phase (predecisional phase) is characterized by ciuding) tendency to facilitate predictions of when the deliberation.Anindividualfusthastodecider,vhichofhisor motivationaL task of deliberation wiil be completed. The her manywishes to pursue. A person's motives are assurned more thoroughly arr individual has weighed the positive to produce certail wishes. For example, a person rnith a and negative shortand Long-term consequences of engagstrongachievementmotive (Chapter6; andaweakaffrliation ing or not engaging in a particular behavior, the closer he motive (Chapter 7) is expected to experience more wishes or she comes to the belief of having exhausted all possirelated to achievement than to affiliation. Yet because peoble routes of action. The chances of gaining new insights p1e'sneedsandmotivesproducemorewishestharrcanpossiinto potential consequences decrease, and the facit tenblybeenacted,theyareforcedtochooseamongthem,comdency, i.e., the tendency to decide on a certain wish or mitting ttremselves to certain selected goals. To this end, they potential goal, increases apace. However, a decision is only weigh the desirability ald feasibility of their many wishes. made when a previousiy stipulated levei of clarification The objective of the predecisional phase is thus to decidehas been attained. Thjs level of clariication is positively based on the criteria of feasibility (i.e., the e4pectanc-v that correlated with the personal importänce of the decision and the actionwillsucceed) ald desirability (i.e., thevalue of the negativeiy correlated with the costs incurred in acquiring expected action outcome)which of their wishes they really information on potential consequences arld thinking that want to pursue. hedividuals contemplating the feasibility of information through. As shown by Gollwitzea Heckhausen,. a potential goal wiJl ask themselves questions such as the andRatajczak(1990),however,theprocessofdeliberationca11 following:
be shortened by thinking in depth and detail about how one of s Carr I obtain the desired outcomes by my ol.rm activity the alternatives under consideration mightbe transiatedinto (actionoutcomq exp ectancyf action. In an experimental design, these authors found that E Is the situational context facilitating or iahibiting participants who anticipated a decision and pianned their 274
The Predecisional Phase (action-by-situation expectanry)?
The following questions are also crucial:
the desüed outcome? t * Might favorable opportunities to pursue it arise?
the questions have no hard and fast arrswers (e.g., it is rlifficult to gauge outcome-consequence expectancies when the consequerrces irr question involve exiernal er,'aluation orprogress toward a superordinate goal), and irl most cases, there is not even enough time to address a_li of the questions that might be answered-A. Achtziger and P M. Gollwitzer
The Rubicon model thus postulates the facit (i.e., con_ subsequent actions were quicker to make a decision. However, even a wish with a hish resultant motivational ity) do es not necessarily gain access to the executive. Rather, it _ first has to be traasformed into a concrete.goai. This transfor-Preactional Phase It may not be possible for nevrr$ formed goa1 intentions to be impiemented immediately. The individual maJ' first have to compLete other activities, or wait for suitable oppofunities to arise. Moreovet many goal intendons specify goal states (e.9., spending rnore time rvith one's famitSi graduating il I' irr a Do I have the necessary time arrd resources to pusue tendency (i.e., high expected value and hence high desirabil-
The desirabilityof apotential goa-l or desired outcome is deter-mation is often described as crossing the Rubicon in ailusion-----mined by reflecting on questions such as the following:
to Julius Caesar's crossing of the stream that once marked * \ly'hat are the short-and long-term consequences of pwthe boundary between Italy and Cisatpine Gaui. By leading suing this goal.?
his army across the Rubicon and rnarching on Rome, Caesar n Howpositive or negative might these consequences be committed himself irrevocably to civil war. The transformafor me? tion of a wish into a goal invoives a shift from a fluid state of I Howprobable is it that these consequences will occur? deliberating the value of a potential goai to a firm sense of In addressing these questions, the individual weighs the cornmitmenttoitsenactment,i.e.,totheformationofa"goal expectedvalueof awishorpotentialgoal;reflectsonitsposintention' (see Section 11.5 for a deflnition of "goal intenitive and negative, short-and long-term consequences; and tion'). Phenomenoiogically, it results in a feeling of determiassesses the probability *rat achieving the desired outcome nation arrd certainty of taking the necessary action (Mchotte . or potential goal will bring about these consequences. It is & Pnim, L9I0). The goal specified in the wish thus becomes ..'. --.. assumed that people do not contemplate their wishes and an end state to which the individual feels comrnitted. potential goals in isoladon, but see them in relation to other wishes and potentiai goals. Awish associated with a number e In the predecisional phase, individuals contemplate the feasibility of artractive consequences may thus sud.denly appear less :l:-tlt: wishes as well as the desirability of potential action outdesirable in the light of a superordinace wish. conversely, u tottt:.This process of deliberation culminates in commitment to wish may appear more feasible when contempl"t"t; ä; a.lecific goal (goal intention)in crossing the "Rubicon" between cÖntexi-ofother-w{shesi-irarrwhen.seeninisoiu.io,,#csa!S.IetE-LSI9rye!is!-.ol9w!-s!intoabinding8oaI.tion of the deliberation process varies ftom case to case. It is :j:t:]li::*'"t results in a firm sense of commitment to translate rare for answers to be found to all questions. in fact. marrv of trroL suqr " 'to action' ftom coliege, etc.) thai cannot be achieve<i instarrtl,v. Conse-phase. They choose sirategies and formulate plans (e.9., implemenquently, peoplemaybe forcedto waitfcrfavorable opportu-iation intentions; see also Section 11.5) that seem conducive to niries to arise before progressing toward rhe iniended goal atiaining the aspired goal state.
state. Äccording to the Rubicon model, individuals in tb-is waiting stage are in the second phase of a course of action -Actiona.lPhase the volitional preactional (or postdecisional) phase. The The initiation of action designed to further the plals forterm "volition' indicates that the motivational d.eliberation mulated in the pieactional phase signa-ls the transition to of potential action goals has been terminated by crossing the actional phase. ha this phase, the individua-l's efforts are the Rubicon, and that the individual is now cornmitted to focusedonpursuinggoal-directedactions andbringingthem achieving a specific goal state. The task facing individuals in to a successful conclusion. These efforts are best facilitated --trüspoStdecisionai(bütpreacilonältpFis,whichimp1iessteppingupeffort
how best to go about attaining the chosen goal. Thus, it is no in the face of difflcr:lties, and resuming goal-directed actions 'longeraquestionofselectingdesirabieandfeasiblegoals,but aftereveryinterruption.Whetherornotanactionisexecuted of deterrnining how to facilitate the achievement of the goals is deterrdned by the volitional strength of the goal intention. chosen; e.9., by means of routine behaviors that are more Thelevelofvolitionalstrengthactsasakindofthresholdvalue 1..-. or less automatic or newly acquired behaviors that require for effort exertion. Although this threshold is primarily deterconscious thought. Ideally, peopie in the preactionai phase mined by the strength of the motivational tendency, it may -should also develop plans specifying when, where, and how bespontaneouslyshiftedupwardwhensituationalditfrculties goal-directed behavior is to be performed (Goliwitzer, 1999) . are encountered. The primary source of increased volition is , These plans are calied implementation intentions (Section the extra effort mobilized in response to situational difficul-11.5).AccordingtotheRubiconmodelandthetheoryofinten-ties. Lr this phase, action implementation is guided by the tional abtion control (Gollwitzer, 1993 (Gollwitzer, , 1999 , implementation mental representation of the goal to which the individual has intentions concerningthe initiation, execution, and termina-committed, which may well be outside his or her conscious i I 'l lr ti ri ti il tion of actions help people to overcome the dilfrculties that cal be anticipated as they progress toward their goals. People often find it particularly ditfrcult to get started, instead engaging in extended procrastination and overlooking viable opportudties to initiate goal-facilitating behavior. These are ''"the problems to be overcome in the second phase of action. HoW then, is action initiated when a rnore or less favorable opportunity arises? The co'ncept of the fiattendencywas introduced to answer th-is question. By crossing the Rubicon, people commit themselves to enacting their chosen goals. The stength of this commitrnent, which ttre Rubicon model labels volitional strength, is a positive linear function of the strength of the corresponding motivational tendency (i.e., the desirability andfeasibility of the intended goal). The srength of a goal intention's fiat tendency is the product of its volitional strength (i.e., the commitment to püsuing the goal state) and of the suitabüity of the situation for its initiation. The suitability of a situation is not determined in isolation, but relative to other opportunities that might occur in the future (longitudinal competition). The fiat tendencies of an individual's other goal intentions also have to be considered. Itwould be mrong to assume that peopie always take action to promote a goal with a high fiat tendency. Many situations are conducive to awhole range of intentions, not all ofwhich can be implemented at once (cross-sectional competition). Ia this case, the goal intention with the highest fiat tendency gains access to the executive, and actions seeking to accomplish it are irritiated. E ln the preactional phase, individuals contemplate how bestto pur sue the goal to whioh they committed atthe end ofthe predecisional awaleness.
O In the actional phase, individuals seek to enact the plans made in the preactional phase with the aim of enactingthe goal formulated at the end of the predecisional phase. These efforts are best facilitated by steadfast pursuit ofthe goal and by stepping up the effort exeded in the face of difficulties.
Postactional Phase
Thetralsitionto the fourth and final action phase, the postactional phase occurs once the goal-oriented actions have been completed. The task to be addressed at this stage is again a motivational one. Specifically, individuals measure the results of their actions against the goai set at the end of the predecisional phase, asking questions such as the foilowing: s Howwell have I succeeded in achieving my goal? s Did the action result in the positive consequences anticipated? * Can I now consider my action intention completed? w If the goal was not attained, do I need to keep working toward it, perhaps by other means? Individuals in the postactional phase thus look back at the action outcome attained arld, at the same time, cast their thoughts forward to future action. If the action outcome corresponds with the aspired goal state, the underlying goal is deactivated. In many cases, shortcomings in the predecisi.onal deliberation of an action's positive andnegative, shortand long-term consequences may become apparent at this point. It may, for example, emerge that the desirabilitv of ttre goal was overrated because certain outcome erpectancies il tl j I zto were overestimated or overiooked. Of course,.not a.ll comparisons between intended and achieved outcomes result in the deactivation of the goal: the action outcome may deviate from the intention in quaütative or quantitative terms. The goal may then be adjusted to the outcome by lowering ttre level of aspiration. Alternativeli4 individuals may choose to retain the original goal despite the rinsatisfactory outcome, and renew their attempts to achieve it. Deactivation of a goal that has not been achieved seems to be facilitated by the prospect of a new goai taking its place. For example, Beckmann (1994) showed that pa-rticipants could only detach mentaliy from a poor score on an intelligence test if they expected a new test to be admilistered in the next round. Participants who didnothave this prospectkept ttrinking about the poor test result, i.e., engaged in self-evaluative rumination.
O In the postactional phase, individuals evaluate the action outcome achieved. lf they are satisfied with the outcome, they deactivate the goal set at the end of the predecisional phase. lf they are not satisfied with the outcome, they either lower the level of aspiration and deactivate the goal, or retain the original level of aspiration and increase their efforts t0 achieve the desired goal.
LL.2.2 Motivational vs. Volitional Action Phases
Kurt Lewin (f926b) and Narziss Ach (1935) understood volition to be the form of motivation involved in goal striving, and goal striving tö encompass all processes of motivational regulation that serve the pursuit of existing goals. Thus, volition concerns the translation of existing goals into action and, specificaliy, the regulation of these processes. Motivation, in contrast, concerns the motivational processes involved in goal setting. The focus here is onwhich goals apersonwishes to pursue. People who have to decide between different goals are assumed to weigh the erpected value and attainability of the available options very carefully (Gollwitzer, 1990) . Classic motivation theories rely on this narrow defiaition of motivation, assuming the motivation to act to be determined by both the desirability and perceived feasibility of the aspüed goal. If someone does not believe him. or herself capable of doing what is needed to attajn a goal, or does not consider a goal particularly desirable, he or she will not be motivated to do all she carl to pursue it. In the early 1980s, KuhI reestablished the distinction between motivation and volition, and drew a clear line between modern volition research and the more philosophical debate on "foee *ill" Kr.rru, 1983 ; see also Chapter 121. KuhI was the first modern motivation researcher to drar,rr attention to the contrasting functions and characteristics of "choice motivatiorl' ald "controi motivation," and süongi-y adiT6cated that a cüstincüon be made betr,treen rnotivational and volitional issues in research (Kuhl, 1983 (Kuhl, , 1984 (Kuhl, , 1987 .
.A. Achtziger and P. M. Gollwitzer SUMMARY Motivation concerns the processes and phenomena involved in goal setring, i.e., the selection of goa-ls on the basis of their desirability a.lrd feasibility. Nlotivational processes dominate in the predecisional and postactional phases ofthe Rubicon model. Volitional processes and phenomena, on the other hand, concern the tanslation of these goals into action, Voli. tional processes dominate in the preactional and actional phase.
L1.3 Action Phases and Mindsets: How Can Psychological Processes Be lncorporated in an ldealized. Structural Model?
The Rubicon model of action phases implies that goaldirectedbehavior canbe broken downinto aseries of consecutive phases. The prernise for this kind of research approachis that the phases identifi ed descnbe qualitativeiy different psychological phenomena that correspond to the different funcrtrons of each action phase. The Rubicon model is thus both structural and fu nctional in nature ft{eckhausen, 1 9B7a). The main fi:nctions of the four action phases identifi.ed are listed in the following ovewiew.
Each of these functions is assumed to be associated with a different mindset; i.e., a form of information processing that is appropriate to the action phase at hand. Based on the terminology of the wtirzburg school (Chapter 2), the concept of mindset refers to the states of mind that are associated with the assumption ald execution of specific tasks fMarbe, 1915; Heckhausen, 1989).
DEFINITION
The term "mindsef' describes a certain kind of cognitive orientation that facilitates performance of the task to be addressed in eacn action ohase. i Mindset research is based on the idea that distinct tasks have l to b e solved in Cagb lh4Cg glthe-Bub:tlln ms-de-l {Goii}4!Zg-",j 1990).
In theü comprehensive research program, Gollwitzer and colleagues (see the.overview il Gollwitzer, 1991) have found evidence for qualitative differences betrveen action phases, and they have shown that task-congruent mindsets determine the content arrd form of information processing in each acrion phase. Within the research paradigm founded by Gollwitzer, the characteristic task demands of the deli.beration, implementation, action, and evaluation phases are fust ,Lil ,iill -'
1y1e1ir:ation and Volition in the Course of Action -277 aneJ4ed,, allowing hypotheses about phase-specific differ-prevents iis postponement. To ttris end, ttrere is cognitive tun-I .rr"", in informatiön processing to tien be derived and s-vs-ing tor,t'ard iäformation relevant to where, when, and hou' to ' Th"r" h14,otfreses, which are outlinedbelow, concern the cog-in the sense that people shouid concentrate on inJormation nitive orientations that are functional for addressing phase-relevant to task performance, a:ed ignore incidental, less relj., ' ,f ".in.
turtr. tt is assumed that each phase is associatetiwith evarrt information. Thus, attentioil is focused on a specified , acertainmindset (i.e., withthe activation of speciflc cognitive opporhrnityto act, andthe individualis shieldedfromthe disr, procedures) that facilitates performance of the task at hand. tracti.ons of competing goals, etc. This shielding ftmction also -.:
aDpliestoi:
The deliberative mindset is associated with the predecisional is irälevant to the initiation of goal-directed behavior and is, .,.. . phaseandthuswiththetaskof goalsetting.\Mhatkindof cogin fact. disrractins. nitirre orientadon characterizes this mindset? How do peo-, ple in tiris mi:rcisei altend to and process information? i:::.di-S Individuals in the implennental mindset are partlcularly receptive to ,ria,ra. in the predecisional phase are faced with the task of information relating to the initiation of goal-directed behavior. At "
"'äeciding which of their wishes to iranslate into action; they tie same time, there is closed-mindedness in the sense that only .=_-._..have to weigh ttre relative desirability and feasibilitv of theü information that wiil help to promote the chosen goal js processed.
... wishes in order to select comparatively atftactive and attain-Actional Mindset ':
able action goa-ls. Solving this task requires individuals in the if* u.aio"uf mindset is associated with the actional phase, . , deliberativemindsettobe primarilyconcernedwith informa_ *re task of which can be described as acting toward the goal ;y,:Tää::f:,x'J:-Ji,::ilffi1T:ffiH#:lT,T"1 ;:ir"T,ä3.":ll*;",ffi*t;il:ffi.ä:;l;ff,.J tially as possible; it is important that negative consequences äence characteristics of what Csikszentmihalyi (1925) called should not be overlooked. Likewise, feasibili-ty assessments ,,flowerperience,,andWicklund (f986) labeled "dynamic ori-
. should be as accurate as possible, i.e., neither overiy optientation.,, Specifically, ind.ividuals in this mindset no longer . .misticnorunnecessarilypessimistic.Onlyifexpectanciesald -^d^^-^-,r.'-^,,"r'r." nf the onal tn hc achievea-or on tt incenrives are assessed in an objective .'u;;;1ä3# äffi::Til, :,:fJi:';.#::"#iiJ""i:fr"#H'":T ä'i:
can the predecisional task of selecting a comparatively destr sider alternative.strategies, neither dp they form implemenable and attainable goal be accomplished successfullv.
tation intentions or action plans specifyingwhen, where, and :'*"" "'*":^'." "^ *:*"*''*-ImplementalMindset how to act. Rather, they are totally absorbed in the actions
The implemental mindset is associated wifh the preactional being executed.Accordingiy, theyonlyattendto those aspects phase; its task is to prepare for goal strivi:i;; e.g., by under-of the seif and the environment that sustain the course of iaking efforts to initiate appropriate actions. The concrete action, and ignore any potentially disruptive aspects (e'g'' approachtaken depends on the type of goal set.If, upon cross-self-reflective thoughts, competing goals, or distracting enviingthe nubicon, the goalwas furnishedwithimplementation ronmentalstimuli).The actionalmindsetisthereforehYpothintentions (Sections 11.5-f 1.7) specifiTingwhen, where, and esüed to be one of cioSed-mürdedness to any in-formation how actions are to be irritiated, all that remains to be done that might trigger reevaluation of the goal selected at the end is to wait for an appropriate opportunity to arise (i.e., the of the predecisional phase, reevaluation of the implementa-"when'r and "where" specified. in the implementation inten-tion süategy chosen, or anyform of self-evaluation (e.g', "Can . tion). As soon as a potentially viable oppcrtr:nity arises, the I be proud of myperformance thus far?", "Do Ihave the necesindividual compares itwith the oppoftunity defined as favor-saryskills to achieve the goal?"). Rather, the actional mindset able in the implementation intention. If a match is ascer-should evidence cognitive tudng toward internal and ertertained, goal-directed behavior is initiated immediately. The nal cues that guide the course of action toward goal attainsame holds for goals that do not require implementation ment. This information shouid be as accurate as possible;
intentions because they are habitually initiated in a specific its evaluation should not be positively biased. haS led to the intended outcome and desired consequences. Säiving this task requires individuals to be primarily concernedwjth the quality of the action outöome ald the actual desirability of its conseo;rences. In other words, individuals in the evaluative action phase compare what has been achieved (outcomes) and obtained (consequences) withwhat was originally expected or intended. Accurate assessments of the quality of the outcome and objective, impartial views of the desüability ofits consequences are thus required. Accordingly, the evaluative mindset should evidence ttre following characterisrics: r cognitive tuning toward information relevant to assessing the quality of the achieved outcome and the desirability of its consequences, { accurate and impartial processing of that information, and r a comparative orientation: the intended outcome and its expected consequences are compared with the actual outcome and its conseouences.
SUMMARY
The action phases of the Rubicon model are characterized by four distinct goal-oriented behaviors: deliberating, planning, acting, and evaluating. Because each phase involves a distinct task, each is associated with a mindset condücive to perforrning that task. The cognitive characteristics of each mindset can be specified by critically analyzing the demands of the tasks addressed in each action phase. For example, the deliberative rnindset is characterized by open-mindedness, and by the objective processing of all available information on the potential consequences of an action outcome (desirability) and the viabilityof the individual's wishes (feasibili$. The implemental mindset is characterized by cognitive tuning toward information that facilitates the injtiation of goaloriented behavior, and that prevents its postponement. The actionalmindsetfocuses attention on those aspects of the self and the environment that sustain the course of action; arry potentially disruptive aspects (e.9., self-reflective thoughts, competing goals, or distracting environmental srimuli) are ignored. Finally, in the evaluative mindset, there is cognitive tuning toward information t}lat heips to assess the quality of the achieved outcome as objectively and accurately as possible. To this end, the individual compares what has actually been achieved (action outcome) and obtained (consequences of that outcome) withthe intended or expected outcomes and consequences.
Contrasting Effects of the Deliberative and lmDlemental Mindsets
Having discussed the theoreücal backgror:nd to the four mindsets inSection I l.3,we nowpresent empiricalfindings in A. Achtziger and P. M. Gollwitzer support of the hypotheses formu-lated about the deliberative ald implemental mindsets. We focus on these trr"ro mindsets simply because research has yet to examine the actional and evaluative mindsets, or to test the hl4lotl-ieses derived about information processing and cognitive orientations in these läst two phases of the Rubicon model. We begin by describing how the deliberative and implemental mindsets can be induced ero erimenta.llv.
Experimental Design Comparing Deliberative and lmplemental Mindsets x induciion of the Deliberiitive Mindsei:
Participants are asked to identify a personal concern (problem) that they are currently deliberating, without yet having decided whether to make a change (i.e., to act) or to let things take their course (i.e., to remain passive). For example, they may oe contem plating whether it makes more sense to switch majors or to stick with their current one. ParticiDants are then asked to list the potential short-term and long-term, pdsitive and negative consequences of making or failing to make a change decision, and to estimate the probability ofthose consequences actually occurring (cf. Gollwiüer & K-,rney, 1989, Study 2; Gollwiüer & Bayeri 1999).
x Induction of the lmplemental Mindset:
Panicipants are asked to identify a goal (project) that they intend to accomplish within the nextthree monihs; e.g., applying for a grant to study abroad. They then list five steps that have to be taken to accomplish that goal, and finally write down concrete plans on when, where, and how to take each step. They thus specify the exact time, place, and manner in which each step toward realizing the goal is to be taken (cf. Gollwiter & Kinney, 1989, Study 2; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999) . r Alternative Means of lnduction:
Puca (2001) and Puca and'Schmalt (2001) induced the deliberative mindset by interrupting the decision-making processes of participants who were poised to make a decision, such that they continued to deliberate on the alternatives available. They induced the implemental mindset by allowing participants to make a decision (between alternatives). Participants were then administered tasks that had nothing to do with the decision task, but served to investigate the effects of the respective mindset on different cognitive processes. Gollwitzer and Kinney {a989tStudyl) had alieady-taken a simiiar appi'oach, inducing an implemental or a deliberative mindset by presenting participants with a decision task. Specifically, the implemental mindset was induced by asking participants to decide on a certain sequence of trialb before the dependent variables were assessed. The deliberative mindset was induced by intenupting panicipants shortly before they made a final decision on a sequence 0f trials.
-Motivation and Voliiicn in ihe Couise of Action Lj-.4.1-Cc gn itive Tu n i n g Toward Task-Con gruent lnformation
The implemental mindset is assumed to promote goal attainment by helping people to overcome the classic probiems of goa-l suiving; e.g., doubting the attractiveness and hence the desüability of the goai being pursued, the practicability of goal-directed strategies, or the feasibiJity of the aspired project. Empirical data support these assumptions, show--ing that the implemental s3 nqsg!_elrckeq Jggiltiyg h4u ' toward information related to goal attainment. Parricipants ....=-in aD implemental mindset repoft more thoughts relating ,. to the execution of an aspired project (i.e., "implemental" thoughts of the tlpe "I'11 start with X and then move on to : Y') than participants in a deliberative mindset (who tend ":-t-leport "deliberative" thoughts of the type "If I do this, . ' (1990) induced either an implemental or a deliberative mind-. set using the pro cedure described in Section I 1.4. Participants lvere then presented with three fairy tales that were cut short at a certain point in the plo t. Inwhat was ostensibly a creativity ' t test, theywere asked to continue the story. Participants in the , . imilemental mindset were more likely to have the protago--,-==nists of tleir stories plan howto carry out a chosen goal than ': ' were participants in the deliberative mindset. In a second ;"::=study, participantsin an implemental or adeliberative mind-' : setwere shown a series of slides, eachpresentingaa image of a . person alongwith sentences reporting that person's thoughts : ort the pros and cons of a specific course of action and plans to put it into practice. After viewing the slides and working on a short distacter task, parricipants were administered a ' cued-recall test of the information presented. Implemental , participants were better able to recall information relating to .' the when, w-here, arrd how of goal achievement tharr information relating to the pros and cons of a change decision.
. The recall performance of deliberative participants showed . the reverse pattern.
SUMMARY
The thoughts of individuals in the deliberative mindset are more attuned to action alternatives than to strategies of goal achievement; Likewise, individuals in the deliberative rnindset recall information associated with the deliberation of alternatives betier thal information pertaining to the accomplishment of goal-directed actions. Individuals in the implemental mindset devote more thought to ptanning goal-directed behavior than to contemplating action alternatives, and find it easier to recall bJormation relating to the piarrning of actions than to the contemplation of action al.ternatives.
t1.4.2 Processing of Relevant and lrelevant Information
Gollwitzer and Bayer (1999) report that the implemental mindset leads to "closed-mindedness," to the extent that individuals in this mindset do not allow themselves to be djstacted by irrelevant inforrnation, but focus exclusively to the accomplishment of thöir goal. This find:ng is substantiated by the empirical data of Heckhausen arrd Goilwitzer (1987, Study 2), who found that impiemental participanrs have shorter noun spans (a good indicator ofreduced cognitive processing speed; Dempster, 1985) than do deliberative participants. A set of studies using a modified Müller-Lyer task confirmed that imFlemental participants' attention is more centrally focused thari that of deliberative participants, and that people in a d.eliberative mindset are more fikely to attend to incidenta.L informadon than people in an implemental mindset (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999) . In a decision experiment that requted respondents to choose between the Rubicon model and Festinger's dissonance theory Beckmann and GoUwitzer (1987) showed that information relevant to the ongoing action is processed preferentially in the impiementa-l mindset, even when it is not in line with the decisions that have been qrade.
SUMMARY
Empirical research has shoum that people in the deliberative mjndset are more likely to be distracted by information that is irrelevant to goal attainment. This finding is in line with the observation that individuals in the deliberative mindset attend to incidental information. The reverse holds for the implemental mindset. Here, processing is attuned to information of direct relevance to goal attainment, and attenJion is centrallyfocused.
.3 Biased Processing of Information Relating to Goal Feasibility and Desirability
Mindset research assumes that the implemental mindset fosters apositive evaluationof the chosengoal (i..e., itshighdesirability) and, at the same time, promotes a highly optimistic assessment of its practicabilityand attainability. The deliberative mindset, by contrast, is assumed to generate objective assessments of the positive and negative consequences of goal attainment, ald a more careful evaluation of the probabilitv of achieving the goal. Various studies (cf. Gollwitzea 1990) have been conducted to test these hlpotheses; one of the classic studies is described on the next page.
Classic Study on "lllusionary Optimism" in the lmplerhental Mindset ln what is known as the "contingency learning task" (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) , participants perform a series of trials 0n a singlestimulus apparatus. Their task is to determine to what degree they can influence the onset of a target Iight (i.e., the intended outcome) by choosing to press or not press a button. In other words, participants are told that alternative actions (pressing the button/not pressing the button) can lead to the outcome "target light onset., What they do not know is that target light onset is in fact entirely independent ofwhether or notthey press the button; it is determined by a random generator.
The experimenter can vary the apparent degree of control by changing the setting of the random generator, thus manipulating the frequency oftarget Iight onset associated with each ofthe action alternatives (i.e., pressing or not pressing the response button). An extensive body of research. using this contingency learning task (cf. Alloy & Abramson, 1988) has shown that nondepressed panici-$ants believe themselvesto have control overtarget light onset when this desired outcome occurs frequently (e.g., when the target light comes on in 75% ofpressingandT5o/o ofnonpressing responses) as compared to infrequently (e.g., when the target light comes on in 25% of pressin gand 25Vo of nonpressing responses). Given that tArget light onset is in fact noncontingent to participants, actions, but governed by a random generator, these findings of inaccdrate, optimistic judgments of control are remarkable. Gollwiüer and Kinney (1989) assumed that this unrealistic illusion of control over target light onset would be less pronounced in deliberative mindset participants than in the implemental mindset participants. The authors assumed that people in the implemental mindset tend to see themselves and their abilities in a much more positive light than do people in the deliberative mindset (Section 11.4). They therefore modified the contingency learning task by adding a second apparatus and asking participants to work on 5 sets of 20 trials. A single trial consisted of the choice to press or not press the response button followed by task light onset or non-onset. A deliberative mindset was induced by teiling participants that their objective in the first part of the experiment was to decide which of the two available apparatuses to work on during the second part of the experiment. Deliberative participants were encouraged t0 try out both apparatuses before the experiment proper began to ensure an informed decision. The implemental mindset was induced by asking participants to specify which apparatus üey wouidüse--in-each iriai beiore startinE ing this decision, they were instructed to try to produce as many .light onsets as possible, whether by pressing or not pressing the response button. The participants were thus instructed to ,,find out" for themselves whether pressing.or not pressing the button gave them more "control" over target light onset. 0f course, the experimenter knew that target light onsei was in fact governeo 0y a A. Achtziger and P M. Golhviüer random generator, and entirely independent of pafticipants, actions. Besides the two mindsets, a "iarget light onset'condition was implemented:
* eitherthe "high frequency oftarget light onset,,condition, in which the target light comes on in 75o/o of pressing and 75% of nonpresstng resp0nses s or the "low frequency of target light onset, condition, in which the target light comes on in 25% of pressing and 25% of nonpressing responses. Accordingly, both apparatuses presented either noncontingent frequent or noncontingent infrequent onset of the target liSht. When target light onset was frequent and thus seemed t0 be ',contingent,, on pafticipants' actions (pressing/not pressing the response bui_ ton), implemental mindset participants reported inaccurately high judgments of the degree of control they exerted over target light onset (illusionary optimism), whereas deliberative mindset rated their level of control to be much lower. The deliberaüve mindset participants evidently recognized that high frequency of an event was not necessarily a valid indicator of their own influence over it. The deliberative mindset thus seems to prevent people from adopting unrealistically optimistic beliefs about how much influence they have over uncontrollable events. When, on the other hand, target light onset was infrequent and thus seemingly n0ncontingent, both mindset goups showed rather modest control judgments. lhis finding indicates that people in an implemental mindset can adapt to external constralnts if necessary. lf environmentalfeedbacktellsthem otherwise (e.g.ia,righ rate.of "non-hits,, in the button-press task), they do not cling blindly to a belief of being in control over target outcomes, but abandon this illusion of control.
On the subject of "illusionaryoptimi.srn'in the implemental mindset, Gagnd and Lydon (2001a) report that individuals in an impiemental mindset see the future of their current romantic relationship in a more optimistic light than do individua-ls in a deliberative mindset. Likewise, puca (2001, Studies 1 and 2) estabüshed that the implemenral mindset is associated with an optimistic approach to the choice of test materials of varying difficulty (Study f) and the predictiön of future task performance (Study 2). Relative to deliberative partici.pants, implemental participants opted for more difficult tasks and were more optimistic about their chances of success. Finaliy, Harmon-Jones ald Harmon-Jones (2002, Study 2) discerned differences between the deliberative ald implemental mindsets in terms of how information on the . and nonahosen ätemätlves is processed. Dissonance research discovered that, once a choice has been made, the chosen option is seen in a much more positive light than the nonchosen option. Harmon-Jones and Ha;mon-Iones observed that inducijon of an implemental mindset increases this effect, whereas induction of a deliberative mindset reduces it.
Relative to the deliberative mindset, the implementai mirldset is associated with i.ncreased cptimism about ihe degree of personal contol over iniended action outcomes and with a preference for rljfficult tasks. MoreoveS the impiemental mindset is associated with higher estimations of the proba-biLity of success tharr the deliberative mindset.
Mindsets and Self-Evaluation
__, _-Pdi!_q1qgye__q+4=1!qp_131g9ntal mr$elq_!ryS also been . -shovm to affect the way people see themselves. Experimental findings show ttrat people in a deliberative rniadset score much lower on the Rosenberg Self-Fsteem Sca-le (Rosenberg, . 1965 ) than do people in an implemental mindset. Likewise, , students judge themselves to be more creative, intelJigent, :=' "--"1opu-lar, etc., when an implemental mindset is induced than when a deliberative mindsetis induced (Tayior & Gollwitzer, 1995) . leduction of an implemental mindset evidentlyboosts peopie's belief in themseives and their abilities. \A4rere seHratings of susceptibilityto variousrisks are concemed, moreover, findings show that people in an implemental mindset considerthemselves less likelyto fallvictim to various strokes of fate (e.g., being involved in a plane crash or developing diabetes) than do people in a deliberative mindset. Tabie 11.1 presents the resr:Its ofthis study.
1-1.4.5 Moderator Effects in the Deliberative and lmplemental Mindsets
Mindset research has now a-lso established that the effects of deliberative and implemental mindsets are moderated by bothindividual differences (see the foliowing overview) and context variables (cf. Goilwitzer, 2003) .
Bayer and Gollwitzer (2005) discovered that students with a high self-view of intellectual capability look for both positive and negative information that is trighly diagnostic with respect to their achievementpotentialwhen in a deliberative mindsei, but focus only on positive in-formation, whether its diagnosticity is high or low, when in an implemental mindset. In contrast, individuals with a negative self-view of inteilectual capability focus on positive information (irrespective of its diagnostlcity) when in a deliberative mindset and look for highiy diagnostic information, whettrer positive or negative, when in an implemental mindset.
The situational context has aiso been sholvn to moderate the effects of deliberative and implemental mindsets. To date, research on this aspect has focused on predictions on the stability of participants' römantic relationships (Gagn€ & Lydon, 2001a; Gagn6, Lydon, a'eartz, 2003) . For exampie, Gagn6 and Lydon (2001a) found that deliberating on decisions that have already b een made can initiate defensive processing of relationship-related information. Participants who were involved in a romantic relationship were asked to consider the positive and negative consequences of a goal decision that was either associated with the reiationship or had nothing to do with relationstrips in general, and the probability that those consequences wouid occur (see Section 1I.4 for detaiis of mindset induction). Gagn6 and Lydon found that participants gave their partner much higher ratings if the goal decision theyhad consideredwas related to the reiationship than if it was not. Interestingly, the partner ratings given by participants in a delilerative mindset were more positive than those given by participants in an implemental mindset, Gagnd and Lydon (2001a) concluded that deliberation on one's relationship may be perceived as ttueatening, ard that participants evaluated thelr partrrer in more positive terms in order to ward off this threat. In a further study, Gagn6 & Lydon (2001b) assessed the commitrnent pa-rticipants felt to their relationslrip using a questionnaire measure. It emerged that onty high-commitment participants boosted their ratings of their partner to defend their relationship against the threat posed by deliberating on a relationship problem; iowcommitment participants did not. Thus, commitment to the relationship is another important moderator of the effects of the deliberative and implemental mindset in the context of romantic relationstrips. personal strengths or weaknesses. The context and commitment to a relationship moderate mlntdset effects on people,s evaluations of their parfners.
SUMMARY

LL.4.6 Mindsets and Goal Achievement
Studies on the effects of deliberative and implemental mindsets on goal achievement supported the hypothesis that the implemental mindset is more conducive to goal attainment than the deüberative mindset, because both information processing and self-evaluation are focused on the task at hand (Section 11.4 ).
Agoodpredictor of goal attainmentin everydaylife ispersistence of goal-directed behavior, i.e., the tenacity people show in their endeavors to overcome öfficulties and master challenges. Accordingly, some authors have investigated the effects of the deiiberative and implemental mindsets on persistence of goal striving. Findilgs presented by pösl (1994) and Braadstätrer and Frank (2002) suggest that people in the implemental mindset show greater persistence when faced with difficult tasks. For example, Braadstätter arrd Frark (2002, Study 1) found that participaats in the implemental mindset persisted longer at a dfficr:lt puzzle than did participants in the deiiberative mindset.
directed behavior and the perceived desirability of the goal were either high or low, the persistence of goal striving was not influenced by the mindset induced. However, when perceivedfeasibiüty and desirabilitrrwere in opposition (i.e., one was high and the other low), parricipants in the implemental mindset showed greater persistence in goal-düected behavior tha:r öd participants in the deliberative mindset. lmporraltly', moreover, the persistence oi goal-directed behavior associated with the implementai mindset is not rigid and inflexible. Brandstätter arrd Frank (2002, Study 2) observed that as soon as a task is perceived to be impossibie, or persistence in what was assumed to be goal-directed behavior proves to be aversive, individuals in the implemental mindset are quicker to disengage from goal pursuit than are individuals in deliberative mindset. Thus, the persistence instigated by the implemental mindset serms to be flexible and adaptive.
With respect to the effectiveness of goal striving in the implemental and deüberative mindsets, experimental findings rep orted byArmor and Taylor (2003) indicate that implemental mindsets are associated with better task performance than deliberative mindsets, and that this effect.is mediated by the cognitive orientation of the implemental mindset, e. g., enhanced self-efficary, optimistic outcome expectations, etc. (Section II.4.4).
lO The implemental mindset is more conducive to goal striving than the deliberative mindset.
All effects of deliberative and implemental mindsets identified to date are documented in Table 11 .2.
The fildings presented above raise questions about ttre selfregulation of goal striving. Can people intentionally induce a certain mjndset in order to increase their prospects ofreaching a certain goal, or to facilitate disengagement from a goa1, should it prove unrealistic or undesirable? The implemental mindset has proved ptu-tic'Jarly effective for promoting goal strir'ing (Section 11.4.6). In the studybyArmor and Taylor ( Motivation and Vcliiicn in the Course of Action goal success associ.ateci with the implemenial mindsei led to 1nore effectiye self-reguJ.ation of goal striving and to better outcornes on an achie,.,ement-related iask rhan the iess optimistic expeciations associated with the deliberative mindset. Iikewise, PösI (f994) and Brandstätter ald Fralk (2002, Studies 1 and 2) showed that induction of an implemen-ta1 mindset increased the likelihood of goai attainment; this effect seems to be primarüy attributable to the greater persistence in goal striving associated with the implemental .-'=,' '-'forget that the positive effects of this mindset apply primar-' ily to tasks conducted immedlately after it has been induced. The more time elapses between the induction of the imple-, -... =:.,mental mindset and task performalce, the less pronounced : its positive effects on goal attainment, as Gagn6 and Lydon . ",,,','' '-' (2001u) and Puca (2001) have shown.
SUMMARY
Critically, the induction of a mindset does not have a pefinzrnent influence on information processing and seHevaluation; the effects of the deliberative and impiemental mindsets only applyfor a certain time. zöö ol self-reguiation. Goür,r'iüer concludeci thai goais can often only be attained when goal pursuit is supported by ttre seHregul.aio4i strategy of plaaning. Planning is understood to be the menta-l anticipation of goal achievement-Against this background, iwo tq)es ofintention are distinguished:
x goal intenrions and * implementation intentions. The concept of "goal intentions" has much in common with Lewin's (1 92 6b) conceptualüation of intentions.
sense.
Examples of goal intentions are: "1 intend to be a good psychologist" or "I intend to be ftiendly to a certain person."
O Implementation intentions are subordinated to goal intentions; they are plans that promote the attainment of goal intentions. In forming implementation intentions, individuals specify the anticipated situations or conditions that will trigger a ceftain goal-directed response (see the example below). lmplementation intentions have the structure "When (if) situation X arises, (then) | will perform response I' and are often called if-then Plans.
i mnaset'
L: any discussioä of tl:e,reladonshipbetweer*J:e-inp,le--4-Goal-islP-r$-iorls-qpeciry desired end stat-es that hav.e-lot-yetieen i -";;J.-a."r and goai reatjzation, it is impoftart not to attained. Hence, goal intentions are "goals" in the conventional
Different Kinds of Intentions: Goal lntentions and lmplementation lntentions
Both scientif.c psychology and naive everydaytheories often advocate goal setting as a good strategy for enacting wishes and meeting demands. Yet numerous studies have shown , that goal setting alone does not guarantee the accomplishment of those goalseven highly motivated people often flnd it difflcult to transiate their goals into action. Sometimes they are simply hesitant to äctually take action to achieve their goa1s, and do not initiate goal-directed behavior for this reason. Sometimes they strive for too man-v, often competing, goats at the same time, i.ncluding long-term projects that cali for repeated efforts over extended periods. Sometimes the situational conditions are not conducive to goa-l attaiament. For example, someone whose attention is focused on intensive emotional experiences will be distracted and may thus fail to register an oppoftunity to act on his or her goals.
(E Contrary to the widespread notion that goal setting is a sufficient condition f0rthe accomplishment of personal goals and projects, an extensive body of research shows that many goals are never actually
Put into Practice.
Drawiag on the work of Narziss Ach (f 905, 1910, f 935) and KurtLeurin (1926b) , Golb,vitzer (1993 Golb,vitzer ( , 1999 addressedüre cliff,culties of translating goals into action ftom the perspective How then, do implementation intentions differ from habits? In both cases, behavior associatedwith a certain situation or stimulus is initiated automatically as soon as that situation or stimuius is encountered.
lD lmplementation intentions differ from habits to the extent that they originate from a single act of will: the conscious pairing of a desired goal-directed behavior with a critical situation or stimulus. By contrast, habits are formed by the repeated and consistent selection of a certain course of action in a specific situation (cf. Fitts & Posner, 1967; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981) .
!1.5.1 How Do lmplementation lntentions Work?
Numerous studies have investigated the psychological processes underlying the effects of implementation intentions-The focus of research has been on the chronic aclivation of the situation speci.fied in the implementation intention and on the automatic initiation of the action specified. lit l! i!i i, Ttre Situation Specified: Chronic Activation Because forming an implementation intention impües the conscious selection of a critical situatbn or stimu_ius as the if-part of the impiementation intention, the mental rep_ resentation of this situation is assumed to be highly acti_ vated andthus easily accessible (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer, Ba_ver, & McCulloch, 2003) . This heightened cognitive acces_ sibility makes it easier for people to detect arld attend to the critical situation in the surrounding environment, even when they are busy with other things. At the same time, it facilitates iecall of 'J:e critical situationinterms ofhorr,, where, and when the goal-düected behavior is to be enacted.. Furthermore, speed of perception differs: criticai situa[ons are perceived more quicklythan situations no.t specifi ed.in imple_ menta-Lion intentions. Ä ciassic cognitive accessibüitv sturiv is described below.
Clässic Study on the Cognitive Accessibility of Situations Specified in lmplementation Intentions
Findings from a dichotic listening experiment show that words describing the anticipated critical situation are highly disruptive to focused attention. Mertin (1994) presented participants with words to both eaß simultaneously via headphones. participants were instructed to "shadow" the words presented on one channel, i.e., to repeat these words as soon as they heard them, and to ignore the words presented on the other channel. Attention was thus focused on one channel. lt emerged that participants'shad_ owing performance was much slower when words retating to the critical situation were presented to the nonattended channet than when unrelated words were presented. In otherwords, critical words attracted attention, even when efforts were made to direct aüention to the shadowing task. The same effect was not observed either in a goup of participants who had only formulated a goal intention without furnishing it with implementation intentions, or in a group who had not formulated any intentions at all on how to approach the task at hand. This finding indicates that the critical situatjons specified in implementation intentions are unlikely to escape people,s atten_ tion, even when they are busy with other things.
:nG :+ A. Achüiger and P. M. GollwiEer 48 hours iater, particrpants who had specified their choices :
in an implementation intention recalled these options much more effectively than participants who had formujated goal intentions only (Goliwitzer et al., 2002) . Finally, Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and Midden ( 1 99 9), using a iexical decision task, provided further support for the assurnp_ tion that implementation intentions lead to heightened acti_ vation of specified situational cues. participants who had specified critica-l cues in implementation intentions showed faster iexical decision responses than did participants who . had onlyformed goä_l intentions. ;
: O The chronic activation of the situation specified in the implementa-_.. tion intention is thus reftectqd in its heightened cognitive accessi_ bility, which in turn facilitates effectively detecting, readily attending . to, and successfully remembering critical situational cues. i ,: ,,.:: Implementation Intentions andAction kritiation . As mentioned above, action initiation becomes automatic once an implementation intention has been formulated tf_uough a single act of wili. In forming implementation , . I, iritentions, individuals can stategically switch between the : -.',1 conscious and effortful control of goal,directed behaviors .:. and the automatic control of these behaviors in response , to selected situational cues. maticity. The goal-directed behavior specified in the implementation intention is assumed to be triggered immediately, , :
efflcientiy, and without conscious intent whenever the criti-, ;, : i ca]situationisencounteIed.Thus,someonewhohasformed an implementation intention does ' rt have to invest cognitive resources in conscious and effordul control of the goaldirected behaviors specified in an implementation intention;
, rt I, rather, their performance is placed under the d.irect control ofsituationalcues. ,1.t.. Implementation intentions are thus more effective than goa-l intentions alone in various respects. For example, it has , ' , -, been shown thatparticipants who have formed implementation intentions respond to the critical situation immediately,-. , _-J'' even at high levels of distraction. The flndings of dual-task r, .il rhe nndings or a study.using the Embedded Figures rest :ffi'ffi"ffi,ä:ä:&'jf.'jrä?r"j#:",ä1[ä:in#; "''.
(Gottschaldt, lg26) providefurtherevidencefortl-leenhaaced 2001; Achtziger, Michalski, a couwltzer] i"rarr""*gl.-p*-'-',-=. cognitive accessibility of the critica-l situation. The objective ticipants in these experiments have to perform two tasks at -.,.:. -. ofihis.iesi.isiodetecismajier..4.ffgWeS'"that;l';ru;""";".i;;r.r*= within larger "b-figures." Participants who had specifled the interpreted as indicating that the other task taxes cognitive "a-figure" in the if-part of an implementation intention were resources. A series of studies using this arra-turt p*äaigot better able to detect these hidden figures than participants have showa that cognitive ."ro*"".. *. not requted to inil who had onlyformulated a goal intention (steller, 1992) . tiatö the responses Lciuced by implementation intentions. In a cued recalJ' experiment, participants had to decide For example, two experiments by Brandstätter et aI. (200L, when, where, and how to play certain games by choosing Studies 3 arrd 4) showed that students working on a task that between a number of set options offered bvthe er:peiimenter. required them io press the response burton as soon as a parkrasurprisememorytestadministeredbothim-inediaiel-vand iicular stimuii appeared on the computer screen r"rpood"d Further experimental support for tJlis finding has been provided by Achtziger et aI. (forthcoming) and Gart'rilow and executive was biocked, and therefore judged the target person in a stereo typical manner. Blocking the central executive puts aheavyload onthe ftontallobes (Baddeiey, 1996)' meaning that automatic processes take precedence. The finding that implementation intentions take effect even when the central executive of working memory is blocked conflrms that implementation intention effects do not tax cognitive resources. Gawrilow and Goliwitzer (2004) demonstated the effects of implementation intentions in a group of children diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Children withADHD are knovrn to have important deficits in executive functioning and hence in processes that tax cognitive resources. They consequently flnd it very ditf,cult to respond quickly and reliably to stop signals. Before being administered avariation of the stop task (cf. Logan, Schachar, &Tannock, 1997), childrenwithADHD were asked to formulate an irnplementation intention specifying that theywould stop what they were doing as soon 3s they encountered a certain stimulus. Findings showed that, having formulated this implementation intention, ADHD children managed to inhibit the behavior in question just as well as a control group of healthy children-Thus, the studyprovided further evidence that impiementation intention effects are primarily based on automatic processes, and not on processes that involve central executive functions, ald hence tax cognitive resources.
Gollwitzer and Brandstätter (f 997, Study 3) demonstrated tJleimmediacyof actioninitiation as soon as the critica-l situation is encountered. One group of participants formed implementation intentions that specified viable opportunities for presenting counterarguments to a series of racist remarks made by a confederate of the erperimenter; another group formulatedgoalintentions to the same effect.As expected, the implementation intention particip ants initiated their counterarzuments to the raclst comments more quickly.than lmplementation lntention sruDrEs lwrrr cFrNrcAr sAMPLEs. In further stuöes, '
Brandstätter et al. (2001) showed that even patients who have severe problems with action control from chronic cognitive load can benefit from implementaticn intentions. For exam-' ple, drug addicts under withdrawal benefited ftom forming .
implementation intentions specifying when and where to , perform actions that would.facilitate thet return to "normat" life. Most implementation intention patients succeeded . in vwiting a curriculum vitae to be used in job applica-:-" 'tions before a set deadline, whereas goa-l intention participants missed the deadline. In other words, the chronic ' cognitive load associated with withdrawal did not inhibit goal-directed behavior if an implementation intention had been formed. :
Lengfelder and Gollwitzer (200I) tested the hypothesis '.hat irnplementation intentions automate action initiation in studies with frontal lobe patients. Individuals with frontal lobe injury typically have problems with the conscious control of automated actions or habits. \^/henever they see a pair of scissors, for example, they will reach for the scissors and begin cutting, and are not able to consciously and deliberately inteüupt.tfiat action, no matter how hard they try. In other words, a stimulus associated with the execution of a particular action will involuntarily and inevitably trigger that action in these patients. Against this background, Lengfelder and Goliwitzer (2001) administered a go/no-go task to ftontal lobe patients. ln this type of task, participants have to respond to selected stimuli (e.g., to press a button when two of five visual patterns appear on a computer screen), but not to others (i.e., seiective attention). If implementation intentions are indeed based on automatic processes, as assumed by Lengfelder and Gollwitzer (2001) , the padent group should show.faster reaction times to the situational cues specified in an implementation intention in the go/no-go task tban a control group. of healthvindividuals. This predictionwas con- substantially faster if they had formed an impiementation tion to support the processing oi stereotype-inconsistent intention, even when a dual task had to be performed at the information about a target person did not differ dependsame time. Students who had onlyformed a goal intention to ing on whether or not the functions of the central execurespond as quickiy as possible did not show enhanced reac-tive had been blocked. However, participants who had not tion times under the duai-task condition. The results of ttr-is formed an implementation intention proved unable to prostudy are presented il Fig. 11.2 . cess stereotype-inconsistent inJormation when the cenüal ,;i] ] ZöO did dre goal intention only participants. The study presented.below provided empirical evidence that implementalion intentions lead to action initiation even in the absence of conscious intenr.
Study on Action lnitiation in the Absence of Conscious lntent Bayer, Achuiger, Malzacher, Moskowiu, and Gollwiüer (forthcoming) conducted two experiments to test whether implementation intentions lead t0 action initiation without conscious intent once the critical situation is encountered. ln these experiments, the critical situation was presented subliminally (i.e., below the threshold for perception).
In Study 1, Bayer and colleagues investigated whether participants were able to achieve their goal of asserting themselves against a rude experimenter by formulating an implementation intention. Half ofthe participants were encouraged to set the goal of reprimanding the experimenter by drawing attention to her rude behavior (goal intention condition); the other half were additionally instructed to plan to take this action as soon as they set eyes on her (implementation intention condition). Afterwards, faces of either the exDerimenter who had showed the rude behavior or a neutral, unknown person were presented subliminally (as primes) to all participants by means of a tachistoscope (presentation times of less than 10 ms). Primes are stimuli that serve to activate associated cognitive contents. These cognitive contents are presented subsequentto the primes and their effects are measured, usually in terms of reaction times. lmmediately after each prime, participants were presented with ceftain words, some of which were associated with rudeness (e.9., offensive, aggressive, arrogant). Participants were asked to repeat all ofthe words as quickly as possible, and the latencies of their responses were measured by the computer. After the subliminal presentation of the critical primes, participants who had formed an implementation intention to reprimand the experimenter as soon as they set eyes on her showed faster response times to words related to rudeness than did panicipants who had only formed goal intentions.
This finding provides fufther confirmation that the goal-directed behavior specified in implementation intentions is initiated automaticallyi.e., triggered immediately, efficiently, and without conscious intentas soon as the critical situation is encountered.
TroN EFFEcrs. Mght the effects of implementation intentions be atüibutable in part or even wholly to an associated trcrease in goal commitment? If furnishing goals with implementation intentions indeed produces an increase in the level of commi.tment to superordinate goal intentions, the assumption that implementation intentions automatize the initiation of goal-directed behavior and other cogrritive processes would b e immaterial. However, this hlp othesis has noi received arilr empirical support. For example, Brandstätter er a-1. (200I, Srudy 11 found thatrhe posiuve effect of an imple-A. Achüiger and P. M. Gollwitzer mentation intention to submit a curricr:Iurn vitae before a specified deadline was independent of the patients' general commitnent to writing a curricr:Ium vitae. Patients in the implei'nentation intention group were no more committed to the goal than were patients in the goal intention group. Analogous results have been reported in numerous studies ftom domains such as disease prevention (e.9., Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, t997), social impression formation (Seifert, 2001, Studies I and 2; Achtziger, 2003 , Studies t and 2), and tennis competitions (Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, in press, Study 2).
AII mechanisms knormn to underlie the effects of implementation intentions are listed in the foilowing overview.
vacation. Students were given the task of writing a report about Christrnas Eve no later than 48 hours after the event. As expected, students who had formed a corresponding implementation intention were significantly more likely to write a report within the allotted time thart students who had onl1r formed a goa-l intention.
Orbell, Hodginks, arrd Sheeran (1997) found that women who had sei themselves flre goal of performing regular breast self-examilations gready benefited fron forming implementaiion intentions. Similar patterns of results harze t1-.5.2 lmplementatiqn lntentions and the Initiation of Wanted Behavior Because' implementation intentions facilitate attending to, detecting, and remembering situations conducive to goaldirected behavior and, in addition, help to automatize action initiation, people who form implementation intentions can be expected to showhigher goalattainment rates ttranpeople who do not fumish their goal intentions with implementation intentions. Thö resuits of a host ofstudies in very different domains provide empirica-l support for this hypothesis.
Effects of Implementation Intentions on Achievementand Health-Related Behavior
Research on implementation intentions tends to examine goal intentions that are difficult to attain for reasons already mentioned; e.g., because of external or internal distractions or because the action required is unpleasalt or painfui. For exampie, Gollwitzet and Brandstätter (1997) analyzed a goal emergeci for parricipation in -'roluntary caacer screenjag implementation intention effects than those in the former (sheeran & Orbe1l, 2000) , resumption of functional activiry $oup. afrer hip ieplacement surgery (Orbell & Sheeran, 2000) , and
Sheeran et a-1. (2005, Srudy 2) fo'.:nd t&at implen:entaCon engagenenr in physical exercise Milne, Orbell, & Sheeran, intention effects only occur when the respective superordi-2002). Furthermore, impiementation intentions have been nate goal intention is activated. The implementation intenfound to facilitate the attainment of goal intentions that tionto move ontothenertiteminanintel.ligencetestimmeare otherwise easilyforgotten;e.g., regularintakeof vitamin diately after finishing the previous one enhanced speed of tablets (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999) or sigrr.ing each page of an task processing only when the goal intention of working as : intelligence test (Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 200\) .
quickly as possible was activated. Likewise, in a! eq)eriment usiag the Rogers.and ivlonsell (1995) task-switch para.ligm, --Si3=lficentModeretsrsofIn:plencntati'oGoüw-itzer (2002)ioirn<ithatimpiemen-
IntentionEffects
tation intention effects are deoendent on the superordinate The strengttr of impiementationintention effects depends on goal being activated. the presence or absence of various moderators. Some stud-Fina-lly, it carr be assumed that the strength of the menies (e.g., Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997, Study 1)'show that tal link beilveen the if-and then-parts of an implementa-_the more diffrcult it is to initiate a goal-directedbehavior, the tion intention moderates its effects. For example, if a person more pronounced implementation intention effects become.
irrvests a lot of time aIrd concentration in encoding an imple-..-The findings of the studywith frontal lobe pati6nts described mentation intention in long-term memory and/or menta-lly above [Lengfelder&Gollwitzer,2001,Study2; Section. 11.5 .1) rehearsing ttrat intention, stonger menta] links should be are relevant here as we1l. Patients with a ftontal Lobe injury {orged between the two parts, which should in turn produce tlpicaltyhave problems with the consci.ous control of behav-stonger implementation intention effects. This assumption ior because their access to executive functions and cognitive
has not yet been subjected to experimental testing, however. , resources is limited. Findings show that patients who formed an implementation intention in preparation for a reaction .
time task outperformed a sample of college students who had formed the same implementation intention. Because the reaction time task can be assumed to be more diffi.cult for the patients than for the healthy students, this finding confrms --" .' that forming implementation intentions is particularly beneficial to people faced with difficult tasks. ' r Q6s1151i111ent to the soal intention also seems to moderate the effects of implemenlation intentions. Orbell et al. (1997) report that implementation intentions only enhanced compliance in performing breast self-examilations in women lvho strongiy intended to examine their breasts, i.e., who were comrnitted to the superordinate goal intention. Similarly, Gollwitzer et al. (2002, Study 3) found that beneflcial effects of implementation intentions on participants' recall of critical siruadons were only observed. when the goal intention had yet to be translated into reality. Ifit had already been accomplished, no implementation intention effect on memoryperformancewas detected. F.urthermore, Sheeraa, Webb, and Gollwitzer (2005, Study 1) showed that the beneficial effects of implementation intentions conceming the goa-l of To date, research has focused a-lmost exclusively on how implementation intentions cal help to translate goals into action by facilitatingwanted, goal-directed behavior, andparticularly the initiation of goal-directed behavior. Yet merely initiating goal pusuit rarely suffices to achieve a goal. Once initiated, a process of goal striving ha-to be maintajned. People need to shield their goals ftom distractions or conflicting bad habits. Ways in which implementation intentions can be used to control these "urrwanted" effects are outlined below Unwanted responses that hamper tfie successful pursuit of goals can be controlled by different types of implementation intentions. For example, someone who wants to avoid being unfriendlyto afriendwho is knorrrn to mäke outrageous requests can protect herself from showing the unwanted response by forming the goal intention "I intend to stay ftiendly'l and furnishing it with one of the following three suppression-oriented implementation intentions: I Ist suppression-oriented impiementation lntention: "A-nd if my friend makes an outrageous request, then I will not resp ond in an unfriendly marrner. " The strate gy here is to control and suppress unwanted behavior by specifring preparing for an upcoming exam increased as a fi:lction of the amount of studying required. Irr addition to strength of commitment to the goal intention, commitment to the specif.c implementation irltention is required. In the memory study by Gollwitzer et al (2002) , the strength of the commitment to the implementation intentionwas varied by telling partici.pants (after administering a battery of personality tests) that theyrvere the qpe of person who wouldbenefit either fromstrictly adhering to theirplans (high commitrnent condition) or from staying flexible (low commitment condition). Participaats irr the iatter group shor,ved notably weaker SUMMARY The diffl culty of initiating goal-directed behavior, the strength of commitnent to goal intentions and implementation intentions, and the activation of the goal intention have proved to be significant moderators of implementation intention effects.
the critical situation in the if-part of the implementation intendon, and ruJjag out ttre un',vanted response in the then-piut. Alternativeiy the focus may be on facilitating the initiation of a r,rrarrted response:
x 2nd suppression-oriented impiementation intention: 'And if my friend makes an outrageous request, ttren I will respond in a fuiendly malner." In thjs case, the critical situation is again specified in the if-part, and the wanted response that is threatened by disruptive unwanted responses is endorsed in the then-part. r 3rd suppression-oriented impiementation intention: "t\nd if my friend makes an outf,ageous request, then I will ignore it." In this variant, the critical situation is again specified.in the if-part of the implementation intention, and the then-part focuses the person awayfr omthe critical situation. Goilwitzer and colleagues have conducted a serj.es of studies using these three types of suppression-oriented. impiementation intentions. Most of these studies investigated the connol ofunwanted spontaaeous responses to distractions or of automatic activation of stereotypes and prejudice.
AL6.t Suppression-Oriented lmplementation Intentions
lVhen goal pursuit is threatened by distracting stimuli, implementation intentions should be formed to inhibit those dis_ tractions, as illustrated by the study described beiow.
lmplementation Intentions and Resistance to Distractions
In a eomputer-based experiment (Gollwi?er & Schaal, 199g) college students peformed a series of arithmetic problems while distracting clips of popular commercials were shown at random inter_ vals on a W screen mounted above the computer monitor. Findings showed that goal intentions ("1 will not let myself get distracted,,) were less effective in protecting participants flom the distractions of the commercials than were implementation intentions. Moreover, implementation intentions phrased as distraction-inhibitin g (,And if a distraction arises, then I will ignore it,') produced better results than those phrased as task-facilitating ("And if a distraction arises, then Iwill focus my attention on the arithmetic tasks,,). Specifi_ cally, distraction-inhibiting implementation intentions helped par_ ticiDa[ts to__Ward off the distractions of the cornne:.cials re{erC] 0f their motivation to do the tedious arithmetic problems, whereas task-faciiitating implementation intentions were effective only when motivation to do the problems was low When motivation was high, task-facilitating implementation intentions did not shield participants againstthe distractions of the cominercials, and performance on the arithmetic tasks was poor. These findings suggest that task_ facilitating implementation intentions may result in overmotivation in distracting conditions and thus undermine performance.
A. Achtziger and p. M. Gollwi[er coNTRoLLrNe pR_EJrJDrcE. Researchers have also iavesti_ gated the function of implementation intentions as shategies for controlling i:nwanted stereotJ1)es in impression foimation. In general, models of impression formation (e.g., Brewer, l9BB; Devine, 1989) assume that the effects of social stereot54)es and prejudices on the way people judge others are governed by processes that require attention, cognitive resources, and conscious effort. Until recently, stereotlpe research assumed thatthe apptcation of stereotypes -butnot their activationcan be intentionally controlled (cf. Brewer, l9BB; Devine, 1989) . Stereotwe activation was thought to be an unavoidable, automatic process; stereogpe use) ro be controllable by effortfi:l correctional strategies. Based on the studies of the automaticity of implementation intentions described above, Gollwitzer's research group conducted a series of experiments to test whether implementation inten_ tions can inhibit the automatic activation of stereotypes and prejudice, ald not just their application. The assumption was that an automatic process such as the activation of a stereotipe can be blocked by other automatic processes such as those triggered by implementation intentions. Experiments using different priming paradigms showed that the auto: matic activation of the stereot)?e "old persorl, was inhibited when participants formed an implementation intention ("\Atren I see an old person, then I wili tell myself: dont : stereotype!"), butwas still observedin a group of partlcipants who had formed a goal intenrion only (,,I intend to judge fairly") and in a control group who were simply instructed '
to form an impression of the people presented (Goliwitzer, Achtziger, & Schaal, forthcoming). Analo gous results emerged from a study in which male participants were asked to inhibit the stereotype "women," and studies in which participants of both sexes were asked to inhibit the stereotypes "homeless person' or "soccer fans" (Achtziger & Goilwitzer, 2005) .
Other studies investigated the extent to which implementation intentions cal pievent the application of stereot]4res. Seifert (2001, Study 1) tested whether the d.iscrimination of female job seekers appiynC for jobs in technical domains carl be controlled by implementation intentions. Computer. science students were presented with a number of applications for the position of computer scientist and a proflle of the job's requirements. Haif the fictional applicants had a woman's name, the other half aman's name. In apreliminary and female narnes were assigned to the applications at random, however, the computer science students were consider-abJ.5r more likeiy to hire male candidates, thus discriminating against the female caadidates. Oniy a group of snldents who had formed the implementation intention "14hen I evaluate an application, then Iwill ignore the candidate,s gender', managedto orrercome this bias. Siereoq,peiesearchhas evidenced that individuals under cognitive load are unable to process Moiivation and Vüliiion in the Course 0fAction stereofrrpe-ilconsistent injormatj.on about unknor,r'n others (cf. ![acrae, Hervstone, & Griffrths, 1993) . Srereorype-6consistent information is nct generallv aüributed to represeniatives oi certain soci.al categories. For example, "machos" are not usually chaJacterized as "tolerant." Successful processing of stereoq/pe-inconsistent informadon results in nonstereotypica-l impressions. In two studies, Achuiger et aI. (forthcoming) replicated ttre finding ttrat stereofireinconsistent information is poorlyprocessed under co gnitive load, and showed that peopie who formed implementation In the research presented in Section 1I.6.1, the critical situation specified in the if-part of an implementation intention was ünked to a then-pait that served to suppress unwanted responses. Implementation intentions may also protect against unwanted responses in another way, however. Instead of focusing on anticipäted obstacies and the -unwanted responses they tri.gger, implementation intentioäs may be designed to stabilize an ongoing goal pursuit. For example, an exchange of opinions can soon develop into an arg!-rnent if the parties are tired and worn out, even if they did not intend the situation to escalate. However, if the parties piannedin advance howto respond constructivelyto conflicting opinions, the self-states offatigue and exhaustion should not have a negative impact on the discussion. These assumptions have been tested in a series of studies, one of r,vhich is describeri below.
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Study on Blocking Negative Self-States one of the studies on the use of implementation intentions io block negative self-states (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 2000, Study 1) was based on the theory of symbolic self-completion (Wicklund & Gollwiüer, 1982) and tesied the extent to which the negative effects ofselfdefinitional incompleteness on social sensitivity (cf. Gollwiüer & Wicklund, 1985a) can be attenuated by forming implementation intentions. Participants were iaw students who were highly commitg,successful-lawyers. As a cover storgthey-wele told thatthe study had been designed to analyze how goals affect how people getto know each other. To this end, theywould be introduced to another student; their goal was io take iiai person's perspective during the conversation. Half of the partjcipants were instructed to furnish this goal with the following implementation. intention: 'And if my partner expresses a preference for a certain topic of conversation, then I will directthe conversation to thattopic." They were then administered a questionnaire on how they approached their studies ('no sense of incompleteness" condition) or the same q uestionnaire with three supplementary questions rdrawing atten-ti0n to shortcomings in their current skills and experience (e.9., "Do you have courtroom experience as a judge or district attorney?").
This second questionnaire was designed to create a sense of selfdefi nitional incomoleteness. Finally, all participants were informed thatthe peßon they were to meet was called Nadia, and that she had already indicated her preferences for potential topics of conversation. Participants were then handed a sheet 0f paper listing these preferences. lt was quite clear that Nadia did not want to discuss law but would preferto talk about her lastvacation and popular movies. To assess whether self-definitional concerns would increase the likelihood of participants' choosing law as a preferred topic of conversation despite Nadia's preferences, all participants were asked to note down their own preferred topics for Nadia. In the control condition, a self-completion effect was clearly apparent participants with an incomplete self-definition were more Iikely to want to talk about law than participants with a complete self-definition, even though Nadia was clearly not interested in discussing this topic. The same effectwas notobserved in the group ofparticipants who had formed an implementation intention, howeverthese participants showed the same low preference for law as a potential conversation topic, whether their self-definitions were complete or incomplete.
These findings show that implementation intentions are able t0 block the negative effects ofthe self-state "self-definitional incompleteness" on goal-directed action (specifically, taking someone olco'c norcncntirio\ Implementation Intentions and Self-Regulatory Performance According to ego-depletion theory (Baumeister, 2000; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, l99B) , performing a task that demands a high levet of self-regulation will encroach on performaace on a second task that also requires interested in whether this effect could be co""t.*d;;;r;;: meiitation intentions. In a cl.assic ego_d.epletion #;;;, participalts were fust shown a humorous movie and instucted either to erpress theü emotions freely, or to show no emotions at all. Theywere then presented with a number of diffrcr:it anagrams. All parricipaats had formed the goal intention to solve as many anagrams as possible. Half the participaats had furnished this goal. intention witl an imple_ mentation intention: ,,And if I have solved one anagram, then Iwill move on immediatelyto the nex.,, participants who had onlyformed a goalintention showed t}le classic ego_depietion. effect, with those who had been instructea not ä show their emotions duringthe flimperformingless well on the anagram task than thcse.r,r'ho had gi-u,en free rein to their emotions. This effect was not observed in participants who had furnished the goal intention to perform well with an implementation inten_ tion, however. Webb and Sheeraa (2003, Study2) also demonstrated that implementation intentions can offset ego_depletion effects. First, half the participants were instructed to balance on their "weaker" leg while counting down in sevens from'l, 000 (ego_ depletion manipuiation). participants in the control condi_ tion counted to 1,000 in fives while standing nomally on two legs. All participants were rhen given theloal intention of naming the ink color of words presented in a Stroop test as quickiy as possible. Half the participants fumished this goal intention with an implementation intention: ,.\Alhen I see a word, then I wül ignore its meaning and name the color in which it is printed." No ego-depletion effectwas observed for implementation intention participants; those who had been ego-depleted in the initiat taskperformed as wenin the strooo test as those in the nondepleted control condition. However, participants who had onJy formed a goal intention showed a marked ego-depletion effect, with those who had been ego_ depleted scoring notably lower on the Stroop task than their nondepleted counterparts.
SUMMARY
The negative effects of both sel_f_definitional incompleteness artd ego-depletion cal be blocked by forming implementa_ tion intentions. l-1.6.3 Blocking Adverse Contextual lnfluences by flqlling Wanted Behavior
People maysee the outcomes oftheir actions in terms of gains or of losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1929) . Conflict_resolution research suggests that cognitive processes triggered by,,loss framiag" or "gain framing,' have a strong UpJ., bn negotiation processes and theü outcomes (De Dreu et al., 19g4) . Loss framing resu.lts in comparatively unfair agreements arrd othernegative effects. Trötschel and Gojh,ri,r., (200+.) *rr.rogated whether these negaCve toss ftaming effects can be or,,er_ A. Achüiger and p. M. Gollwitzer come if prosocial goals, such as firdirg a fair or integtative solution, are fu rnished with corresp ondin g implemenration intentions. This hypothesis was tested. in two e4periments, the first of which is describäd belor,v.
Intentions and Performance Feedback
Goal attainment can also be negatively affected by unfa_ vorable performaace feedback conditions. One example here is the 'lsocial loa_fing,, phenomenon often obsewed at workplaces where employees are given collective, rather thali individual performance feedback (cf. Latan6, Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Karau &\,\rüiams, 1993) r Loss framing condition: The participant was handed a übte listing the four different types of regions, and specifytng the loss that would be incurred if each were relinquished to the other participant in terms of a negative score. The other par_ ticipant in each pair of negotiators was subjected to gain framing. I Gain framing condition: In this conditjon, the regions listed in the table were allocated positive scores, indicating the gain that would be incuned if that region were appropriated. Both participants were told that they had to come to an agreement on the distribution of the 25 regions within 15 minutes. A fairness goal was instilled in some participants by handing them a sheet of paper informing them that fair negotiation outcomes are often . very difficult to achieve, and instructing them to set themselves the following goal shoruy before entering the negotiations: "l want to find a fair solution." Half the partjcipants with a fairness goal were additionally instructed to fümish this goal intention with an implementation intention: ,And if my opponent makes a proposal, then I will make a fair counterproposal.,, participants in the controt condition were not instructed to speciry either a fairness goal or an implementation intention. Outcomes were assessed in terms of individual "profits,, within each pair of negotiators. In each of the three conditions, the authors tested whether the difference in profits within each dyad was significantly different from zero.
In both the goal intention condition and the control condi!!gn,_ significant differences in profits were observed as a function ofthe framing condition. participants who had been subjected to loss framing made higher profits than those subjected to gain framrng. Unfair outcomes of this kind were not observed in the imDlementation intention condition, where profits were equally distributed u--rn groups where indir,idual perfoimalce cannot be moni-Before pariicipanis raiere allorved to drive -tl:e flnal nvo tored have been obseru.--ed to show lor.ver performance lev-circuits of the üack, auto-motive priming was used to actiels. Golltviüer a]ld. Ba.ver (2000, Srudy 4) testeci whether this vate fi,vo goa-Is beyond ihe participants' conscious awarephenomenoncanbe cormteractedbymeans of i:rpiementa-ness. AIl participants were asked to join the numbered dots don intentions. Their participants were asked to generate as presented on different sheets of paper as quickly as possimany uses as possible for a common knife under one of two Lte to produce various shapes (flowers' anima-ls' and other conditions: objects)' Those in the "move quicklf' priming condition E ..Collective performance feedbaclc' condition: Partic-were instructed. to complete as many figures as possible in ipants were told that their responses would be pooled flve minutes. Those in the "move slowly" priming condition with those of seven other participants, and that thJexper-were told. to.join the dois as careftill;r-and neatly as possible'
--imenter would not-be-able to,tell-hor.\,-lraJr}leses-eaeh-ta-€-rg.as Il}ueh E:ne as thsy neeced fcr each-shape' Findindividual had generated. ings showed that this auto-motive priming had prono'nced e ,.IndivrCual perfornance feedbaclc' condition: Partic-effects on goal intention participants' driving in the last tlvo ipants were told that the experimenter would be able to circuits: those in the "move quickly'' condition <irove faster assess each participantt performance separateiy. and made more mistakes than those in the "move slow1y" of results, which replicates the classic social loaflng effect' was not observed in implementation iatention participants' who generated an equal volume ofresponses, regardless of the feedback condition.
As we have shor,nin, implementation intentions facilitate goal pursuit in various ways. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that such an eft-ective means of self-regulation may have certain unJoreseen costs. This section examines the three following potential costs of implementation intentions: i. ft it possible that implementation intentions tread to a certain rigidity of behavior that may be detrimental when task performance requires high leveis of flexibility' 2. It is possible that implementation intentions cause a high degree of ego-depletion and thus undermine selfregulatory resources. 3. It is possible that thoughts, feelings, and actions may resurface later in a different context (rebound effects)' although implementation intentions successfully suppresses tmwanted thoughts, feelings, and actions in a given context.
Ll.7 .t lmplementation lntentions and Behavioral Ri$iditY
Do people who have formed implemeniation intentions also 'recogrrize a.Iternative opporfunities to act towaid their goal' or do they insist on acting only when the critical situation specified in the implementation intention is enccurrtered? The strategic .automaticity created by implementation Motivaticn and Volition in the Course of Action Formation of Implementation Intentions ., 'andComPetingGoals '' tAuto-motive thäory @argh, 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994) holds ttrat when goal striving is activated repeatedly and con-:, ' sistently in response to a given situation, this situation will ': eventuaily acquire the potential to trigger the critical goal oursuitwithout conscious intent (Bargh, f 990; Bargh & GolIwitzer, 1994) . A goal intention that can be activated in tl-is way is called a "chronic goal." Gollwitzer (1998) conducted t!v:o experiments to test whether implementation intentions can shield ongoing goal pwsuit against the effects of directly .
activated chronic goals. '
ln the fust study participants had to navigate a car along a race trackin a simulator. The mean drivingspeed andnumber of errors were measured in two baseline circuits' Participants ' were then given precise instructions on how to drive thenext tlvo circuits.
q Participants in the goa-l intention condition were instructed to set themselves the goal of reaching the filishing post as quickly andwith as few errors as possible' o Participants in the implementation iatention condition were additionatly instructed to form the following implementation iaientions: "And when I enter a curve, then l will reduce my speed. And when I enier a straight section of the track, then I wiJI speed up again." 11.7 Potential Costs of lmplementation lntentions F. I :.:..
A. Achtiger and P M. Gollwitzer !:i intentionsi.e., the delegation of behavioral control to situational cuescan be assumed to free up cognitive resources, thus allowing effective processing of information about alternative opportunities. This assumption has been confirmed in a number of studies showing that individuals who had formed an implementation intention were not biind to changed situational contexts or unexpected opportunities to achieve their goal. Instead of sticking rigidly to their plaas, participants responded appropriately to new situations. For instance, Achtziger (2003, Study 2) showed that participants are abie to form implementation intentions that are only applied in certain contexts. A study on prejudice toward were sho',ryn two synrbols (e.g., flower, heart) on a monitor' and asked to select the s)rynbolwith the highest score. Before'--' the study began, they had been told the score of each synbol, and some participants had formed the implementation intention to select the qrmbol with the highest score especiaily quick by pressing the button as soon as it appeared' A-fter a while, a new slnnbol with an even higher score was presented on the screen. Participants in the implementa: tion intention condition succeeded in selecting tfris new symbol rather than the one that previously had the highest score. a1-.7.2 lmplementation Intentions and Ego Depletionsoccer fans showed that participants were able to appiy the
The assumption that implementation intentions autoDaa!9-. impiementation intention "And if I see a soccer fan, then I'll the control of goal-directed behavior implies efflcient and not evaluate him negatively'' flexibly, dependent on the conrelativeiy effort-ftee behavioral control. In other words, the tert. Inttrisstudy,thepresenceofasignaltoneindicatedthat seif is not implicatedarid should therefore not become. theimplementationintentionshouldbeapplied,whereasthe depletedwhen behavior is controlled by impiementadon absence of the tone indicated that it should not. In Line with intentions. Empirical support for this assumption has beenrhe.assumption that impiementation intentions cio nofne-cprovräeti by the studies of Gollwitzer and Bayer (2000) ano essarilylead to behavioral rigidit5r the ilhibition of preju-WebbandSheeran(2003)reporiedinSectionll.5.2.Whether dice.toward "soccer fans" was on-ly observed when pictures the initiat self-regulating task was to control one's emodons of soccer fans were accompanied by a signal tone. Likewise, (Go[witzer & Bayer, 2000) or to performwel] on a challenging ariotJrerstudy (Jaudas & Gollwitzer,2004) showedthatpa;tictask(the Snoop taskWebb &Sheeran,2003), impiementation ipants who encountered an unexpected oppofuniry*to purintentions successfuliypreservedself-regulatoryresources' It sue a goal intentioni.e., an opportunity other thal the one would thus seem that self-regulation based on implemenspecifiedintheif-partoftheimplementaiionintention-were iaiion inrentions is not costiy in terms of self-regulatory able to recognize arrd seize tJ.is neu' opportu:rity. Pal iicipants resources.
Conüolling uriwanted behavior Promoting wanted behavior
Suppressing unwanted thoughts, feelings, and actions ("suppression-oriented implementation intentions") Inhibiting automatic activation of siereotypes (e.9., age stereotypes, gender stereotypes) Inhibiting prejudjce (e.9., discrimination of women in male-dominated orofessions) Shielding against distractibn during complex tasks (e.9., distracting effects of commercials while \vorking on arithmetic problems) Controlling impulsive behavior in children with ADHD (e.9., enhancing resoonse inhibition in a reaction-time task) Replacing unwanted behavior by other behavior lnhibiting the automatic activation of prejudice (e.9., toward homeless lnhibiting negative emotions (e.g., disgust) Inhibiting behavior that is detrimental to health (e.g., cigarette and alcohol consumption) Shielding wanted behavior frorn unwanted internal and external influences Blocking unfavorable contextual infl uences (e.9., deindividuaiization, competing gcjal activations, framing effects) Blocking detrimental self-states (e.9., self-definitional incompleteness, mood, ego-depletion)
Fostering the initiation and execution of goal-directed actions lncreasing the latency of counterarguments to iacist remarlG
Increasing the probability of participation in cancer screening (e'9., mammography) Facilitating the processing of stereotype-inconsistent information despite cognitive load (e.9., on the central executive) Fosteri n g persistence of goal-directed actions Supporting the regular intake of vitamin tablets and essential medication Helping challenged patient groups to perform difficult everyday actions (e.g., drug addicts under withdrawal to write a CV) Fostering engagement in physical exercise (e.g., after hip replacement surgery) ,,,v?sner (1994) observed that consci.ous attempts to control x implementadonintentionsdonotleadtoego-depletion ..r"ooorur. one's thoughtse.g', "I will not think about pink (e.g., performance levels are not reduced when emotions "*ofr*","
Motivation
lead to rebound effects in the sense that the are controlled. by means of implementation intentions), tiroughts controileci become more readüy accessible and thus and -or. tit.ty to surface in subsequent thoughts and behav-* implementation intentions d.o not lead to rebound ior. participants in his st:dies set themselves suppression effects(e.g.,whenstereotypicatthoughtsaresuppressed).
;ar oi trri,s trna ana *":".:lT:..d ,: nlc_" beil when-_ iuCr tliei,-*,iou ghts'turned-i:*-the Proscdbeö-dir-€en:ön-?ar--6.ip*rc with the goal of not thinking about pink elephants trcrv@r'" "---" ..o*"i.o trI"^ -;:..:_^-',,: _:-: 11.8 Discussion and Future Perspectives ,n tuf4r succeeded in suppressing ttrese thoughts. However, findings from a second phase of tJre experiment, in which oarticipants engaged in free association and wrote down all äf th"ir tho.tghts, showed that participants who had resolved not to think ab out pink elephants in the fu st part of the exp erjinentwere now considerably more likely to report ttroughts relating to pink elephar}ts thal participants who had not set a suppression goal. This is effect is termed the rebound effect:
O The rebound effect involves a marked increase in certain thoughts following the "eKinction" of a goal to suppress or inhibit those thoughts'
Against the background of these research findings, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that suppression-oriented implementation intentions may inhibit unwanted thoughts and feelings to beginwith, but that these suppressedthoughts or feeiings resurface later, i.e., that rebound effects occur. Gollwitzer et al. (2004) conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis. The participants in these studies were first asked to suppress stereotypical thoughts about a carefirlty described homeless person in an impression formation task. Rebound was measured either in terms of subsequent erpression of stereot!4)es in a questionnaire tapping participants' evaluation of homeless peopie in general (Gollwitzer et at., 2004, Study 1) or in a lexical decision task assessing the cognitive accessibility of stereotypical contents regardtrg homeless people (Gollwitzer et a1., 2004, Study 2). It emerged that the participants who.had only set themselves the goal of suppressing stereotypical thoughts when forrn-ing a11 impression of the homeless person experiencedpronognced rebound effects in both studies' showing more stereot],'pical judgments of homeless people in general (Study 1) and a higher accessibility of homeless stereotypes (Study 2). participants who had furnished this goal intention with a corresponding implementation intention did not experience rebound effects.
SUMMARY
Findings on dre potential costs of implementation intentions canbe summarüed as follolvs: t1-8.t lmplementation Intentions: A Foolproof Self-Regulatory Strategy?
Although implementation intentions seem to function effectivelywithout significant costs in terms of behavioral rigidity, ego-depletion, or rebound, they do not always result in the desired outcome. First, the behaviorspecifiedin the then-part of an implementation intention may be beyond the person's control. For example, somebodywho intends to eat healthily may plan to order vegetarian food, but then find themselves in a restaurant with no vegetarian options. Second, it makes no sense to specify situations that barely, if ever, occur in the if-part of implementation intentions. For example, it would be pointless for someone to plan to eat healthily by ordering vegetadan food the next time they go to a good restaurant if they usually eat in ca-feterias or at home. Ttrird, the behaviors specifled in the then-part of the implementation intention mäy not be instrumentai to reaching the goal. For example, someone who plans to eat healthily may order a vegetarian meal in a restaurant, not knowing that the dish chosen is ft:ll offatty cheese.
t!.4.2 Prospective Memory and Neuronal Substrates
In the past 20 years, implementation intention research has focused on motivational and volitional processes and their effects on impression formation and behavior. In the coming years, the focus should be shifted to cognitive and neuroscientific aspects. From the cognitive perspective, implementation intention research stands to benefit from prospective memory research (cf-Smith, 2003) , which examines the processes by which intentions are stored in and retrieved from long-term memory as well as from ongoing attempts to examine the different components of working memory (e.g., the central executive, the phonological loop, andthe episodicbuffer as proposedbyBaddeley, 1986; Baddele-v, 2000) and their functions in the realization of goal intentions and implementation intentions (Achtziger et aL., forthcoming). From the neuroscientiflc perspective, researchers have already used magnetic encephalography to examine neuronal activity in the deüberative and irriplemental 7. What arethe effects of adeliberative rrrinjr"toop"opl.'s evaluations of their romantic relationships?
It depends on the person's comnitment to ttre relationship. If commiüneni is high, the partner is rated more positively after induction of a deliberative rnindset than after induction of an implemental mindset; if cornmit-.
ment is iow the effects are reversed.
B. What is a "goal intentionJ'?
Goal intentions speciff desired end states that peopie wish 9. What is an "implementation'intention"? t' l*pl"mentation intentions are "if-then" statements that specifythe conditions underwhich goal-directed behavior is to be initiated.
10. lvhat function do implementation intentions serve? :." '-Implementation intentions facilitate the enacbTrent of goal intentions that are particuiariy dif0cuit to attain.
Which factors moderate the effects of implementation intentions? '
The foitowing moderatorvariabies have beeqidentiied:
. rlifnculty of the goal intention,
.:
cornrnitment to the goal intention, :il"'-'' ' 295 co ramitme nt to the irnp lementaiio n intenLion' degree of activadon ofthe goal intendon.
12. Are cop.itive resourcesrequiredto putirnplementatiorl intentions into practice?
Irnplementation intentions are initiated automatically and thus do not tax cognitive resources.
What positive effects can implenentation intentions
have on health-related behavior?
Exampi6e reguiar intake ofvitamin tabiets; parriciparion in calcer screening; regular exercise after hip replacement sugery.
How can implementation intentioas inhibit unwanted effects, such as stereotypicalviews ofothers?
Unwanted behavior can be inhitited by forming an implementation intention that inhibits either its activation or its application. The if part of ttle implementation intention shor:ld specify a situation or a stimu-lus that is likelyto trigger activation or application ofthe stereotype; the then part should specify a goal-directed behavior with the potentialto inhibitthe stereotype (e'g., byinitiating or upholding individualized processes of impression formation). ll ll .l .,1
